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WiLLIAM H. ROSE**
When the Pilgrim fathers landed at Plymouth on December 11,
1620, thoughts of legal philosophy were even more remote for them
than was the Virginia coast for which they had embarked. No lawyer
or philosopher was with them to be interested in such conjectures;
and even if one had been there, the problems of existence which con-
fronted these religious adventurers were much too direct and urgent
to invite indulgence in such abstruse speculation. One of these prob-
lems concerned the power of their group to set up a government in
New England rather than in Virginia, where they had been authorized
to settle, and the Mayflower Compact, signed on November 11, 1620,
was their substitute temporarily for articles of state. Further, none
among them doubted that the way of life which they should lead in
this new land was authoritatively prescribed in the Bible. As English-
men migrating from Holland their cultural heritage was united. With
such a culture and with these two documents-the Bible and the
Compact-any philosopher could have assured them, had they been at
all interested, that their experiment in government was well founded
upon the doctrine of natural law. Even the New England coast to
which they came furnished an adequate facsimile of a state of nature;
and they could safely have left to their illustrious countrymen, Thomas
Hobbes and later to John Locke, to dispute whether this virgin ter-
ritory was one of war or of peace.
Any philosophy is explicit in its function, and the stage of culture
which it serves determines the sophistication of its metaphysics-or
even the denial. In the early days of New England there was no con-
flict in ideas regarding the purpose of man on earth or of human
society. Hence there was also no conflict of philosophies to explain
those ideas. The guide for morals, government, religion, in fact for
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all being was one and undisputed. The ultimate source of all knowl-
edge was assured. No erudition was needed to point out that the
theology which these first settlers brought to New England sufficed also
as a philosophy of law, or that legal philosophy like moral philosophy
is revealed in the same authoritative text. Reason and nature may not
have been among the subjects of early Puritan discussion, but natural-
law philosophy need not be articulate to have been as much a part of
colonial mores as was Christian theology. Knowledge of its history and
the refinements of its doctrine were unessential to its existence or to
the importance which it was to have in the development of American
legal as well as political theory.
But this phenomenon, that the general philosophy of a time or
place includes, though unidentified, its special application to the field
of legal theory, is a commonplace of any legal philosophy. When one
accepts the thesis that positive law with its legal institutions and rules
is merely a function of a national milieu, it should not be startling
that the philosophy upon which it is founded is only a special adapta-
tion of the general philosophical theory which explains and justifies
the existence of that society, its arts, its religion, its economic as well
as its social institutions. As long as philosophers interested themselves
in the examination of all knowledge, any other conception of legal
theory was impossible. It has only been since philosophers have
segmented their field of study that lawyers could look upon their own
special facet of social control as the subject of a philosophy all its own.
But the greater truth is essential to a more accurate understanding,
for if law and legal institutions are to be comprehended in their fullest
significance, they must be related to the social order out of which they
spring and which in turn they serve. In this perspective legal philo-
sophy as a branch of general philosophical doctrine is more readily
ascertained, and movements which are ascribed to politics, to literature
and art, to economics or sociology will be found to affect schools of
legal theory too. For early colonial America the task of equating
natural-law theory to the scheme of daily life is rendered relatively
easy because of the purety of its doctrine, its kinship to the religion
and to the centuries of its development. But a proper understanding
of its importance as well as of its applicability to the creation of an
American legal order requires a survey of its origin, its growth and
of the various and even divergent doctrines that have been proclaimed
in its name.
HISTORIC ROOTS
Natural-law philosophy is the oldest American theory of law as
it is also the oldest in western European legal culture. Like so many
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other intreging ideas its origins are in ancient Greece. Law in Athens
was both legislative and customary.' There were codifiers like Draco
and Solon, and Lycurgus of Sparta legalized the stark military stand-
ards of the Laconian state. In the Greek mind as well as experience
law and legal institutions were associated with political power or
with customary behavior. They were not ordinarily identified with the
rational or the ideal. It was speculation by Greek philosophers on the
essence of reality and of virtue which led in time to consideration of
law's ontology and of the relation between human law and the uni-
versal law of nature.
The Greeks had long accepted the theory of an ordered universe
regulated by cosmic laws. Heraclitus (c. 536470 B.C.) believed that
man as a part of nature shares in the eternal order of things, which
eminates from the eternal reason or logos. It was from this conception
of reason and order that Greek philosophers developed a law of nature.
Socrates in the Dialogue, Meno, found in knowledge the measure of
virtue. Plato in his Minos of disputed origin described law as tending
toward the discovery of reality, that is, discovery of the ideal form of
perfect law. His Socrates says that "Whoever fails to attain reality,
fails to attain accepted law." According to Aristotle man is a political
animal endowed with a social instinct. Among all other animals he
alone possesses any sense of good and evil, or of the just and unjust.
Also because of his power of speech it is intended that man shall set
forth these distinctions.2
Political justice, Aristotle said, may be conventional or it may be
natural. If in the first instance justice may be settled one way or the
other indifferently, it is conventional. If it has the same validity every-
where and does not depend upon whether or not it is accepted, it is
natural.3 While Aristotle recognized that in the trial of cases these
philosophical reminations could not displace the written law, as an
orator he taught that when the letter of the law is against the pleader,
he should insist upon the greater equity and justice of the universal
law.4 As opposed to the rule of man, the rule of law was said to be that
of God and reason; for "law is reason unaffected by desire."5 These
were the humble origins from which later was to spring the Grecian
doctrine of a universal natural law.
During the period of the Greek city state there was no need for
a full blown philosophy of universal law. Each city was an auto-
nomous governmental unit. Explanation of divergent views or of
1 CALHOUN, GREEK LEGAL SCIENCE ch. IV; BONNER, LAWYERS AND LrrIGAN's IN
ANCIENT ATHNs 98.
2 ARisro EL, PoLrrIcs (Jowett trans.) 1 and 2; WoRKs, (Ross ed.) vol. 10.
3 ARIsrom, NICOMACHEAN ETmICS (Rackham trans.) 5 and 6.
4 ARISTOTLE, RmTmuc (Roberts trans.) 1 and 15; WoRns, supra vol. 11.
5 ARsToiar, PoLmTCS, supra III, 16.
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similarities in legal orders was not required. This was the case until
the conquests of Alexander forged a Macedonian empire and brought
into a single system of government a motley of alien races and of
foreign laws and customs. The cosmopolitanism which ensued created
a need for a legal order vastly extended if not, at least in theory,
universal. This requirement the Stoics supplied with their doctrine of
a universal natural law. In so doing they laid the foundation not only
for a theory of law in the subsequent Roman system, but still later
for Christian legal doctrine and so for a European and American
philosophy of law. Building partly on Heraclitus, Zeno and the school
which he founded created an elaborate pantheism, a natural religion
in which reason became the law of the universe and of man. Ordained
by reason and by reason's god, virtue reigned as universal law, binding
upon individual reason, in recognition of which human law came into
existence. Justice, hence, is an attribute of nature and is not solely a
convention. The world eminates from God which he rules by his law.
"Nor did I deem," replied Antigone to Creon, the king,
Thy edicts strong enough,
Coming from mortal man, to set at naught
The written laws of God that know not change.
They live for ever, nor can man assign
Whence first they sprang to being.
Centuries later the supremacy of God's over human law was
similatly to be recorded in the Acts of the Apostles: "Then Peter and
the other apostles answered and said, 'We ought to obey God rather
than men.'" When law becomes religion, governments may not
transcend the infinite. Their duty is to follow where law leads; or, if to
lead, then only within the limits of eternal verities. "Man, fearfully
made, is the workmanship of his all-perfect Creator: a state, useful
and valuable as the contrivance is, is the inferior contrivance of man,
and from his native dignity derives all its acquired inhportance."
From Antigone, through Peter the apostle to Justice Wilson in
Chisholm's Executor v. Georgia,6 extend some twenty centuries of
religious thought, partly pagan, largely Christian. It is the law of
nature which unites their theory of justice and which coordinates
their views regarding the relationship of man to God and to the state.
The ancient stoic doctrine was one of respect for law and order,
a frequent concomitant of natural law theory. But also imminent in
any system of higher law inherent in the nature of things is a theory of
rights of man natural to his being, which he may assert in his own
interest in opposition to man-made law. Cosmopolitanism sees every
man as his brother, possessed of equal rights not to be denied by the
6 2 Dali. 419, 454 (U.S. 1793).
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sheer power of a conqueror's reign. It is a militant doctrine of rights
as distinguished from law, of individual privilege as opposed to
governmental power. This tack was taken by the Greek school of
Sophists, who inveighed against the tyranny of human convention.
"God," said Alcidamas, "made all men free; nature has made no man
a slave." While at Rome on an embassy from Athens, Carneades, the
Sceptic, went further and attacked the whole stoic conception of
natural law and an ethical content of nature. Natural law, he claimed,
has no factual connection with the realities of life. Laws have no
sanction in nature. They are obeyed only because of the threat of
penalty. Nature teaches all living creatures to consult their own self-
interest. Rulers are tyrants, though they call themselves citizens. Nor
are men just by nature. Hence weakness and not nature is the mother
of justice. Out of mutual fear of one citizen for another and of one
class for another arises a contract which is the true foundation of
the state.7
These early reactions to the placidity of stoic obedience to law
were the fore-runners of a subsequent theory of natural rights, of
utility as a test for the good life, and of modem legal positivism.
"Man is born free," said Rousseau, "and everywhere he is in chains."8
His rights are proclaimed in declarations, are incorporated into
constitutions and are proposed in international conventions. In terms
of power, prophecy substitutes for reason as a definition of law, and
political force replaces subsumption as a description of the judicial
process. "In these sibylline leaves," wrote Justice Holmes, referring to
Anglo-American law reports, treatises and statutes, "are gathered the
scattered prophecies of the past upon the cases in which the axe will
fall."9 The words are modern but the origin is ancient. Whether one
proclaims a doctrine of obedience to law, or the subservience of human
to natural law, or vice versa of man against the state, or of law in
terms of political might, his thesis is both as modern as a court de-
cision and as ancient as the classics.
The decline of the Greek world and the rise of the Roman Empire
found added scope for a cosmopolitan philosophy of law. For this
need, stoic theory, migrating westward, offered a ready and neat
solution. During several centuries Hellenized stoic culture was the
creed of educated and influential Romans. Taught by philosophers,
such as Panaetius (c. 180 - 108 B.C.), Posidonius (c. 130 - 50 B.C.)
and the Greek slave Epictetus (c. 60 A.D.), it included among its
disciples Seneca (c. 3 B.C. - 65 A.D.), praetor and consul, Emperor
Marcus Aurelius (121 - 180) and the three praetorian prefects, Pap-
inian, Paul and Ulpian, whose opinions, controlling throughout the
7 CIcro, ON THE COMMONWEALTH (Sabine and Smith trans.) 26 ff and 200 ff.
8 RoussEAU, THE SociAL CONTRACr 1.
9 HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS,
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empire, would be comparable in philosophical importance to those of
Justices Wilson, Story and Chief Justice Marshall of our own Supreme
Court, whose predilections for natural law are equally well known.
"The greatest of the jurists," writes Dunning,10 "were of Stoic tenden-
cies, and hence we find at the basis of their work the characteristic
doctrines of the Stoic philosophy. Dealing as they were with the
practical affairs of the whole civilized world, the conception of a
universal law and of the brotherhood of man took on a character of
concreteness that it wholly lacked in the days of the early Stoics and
even of Cicero."
But it was Cicero (106 - 43 B.C.) primarily who introduced stoic
legal theory into Roman juridical doctrine. For Cicero natural law has
divine origin. It is universal and dominant over man-made law. It is
"the highest reason implanted in Nature, which commands what ought
to be done and forbids the opposite."" It is synonymous with right
reason, unchangeable and eternal. Human legislation may not properly
restrict its operation and cannot wholly annul it; nor can the people
or the senate absolve anyone of his obligation to obey it. It is the
same at Rome as it is at Athens. There is in fact "one law, eternal and
unchangeable, binding at all times upon all peoples; and there will
be, as it were one common master and ruler of men, namely God, who
is the author of this law, its interpreter, and its sponsor."' 2
So striking a statement of the evolution of early Grecian unity of
nature and the divinity of law is more easily understood when it is
recalled that the Romans developed two bodies of positive law. One
of these, the ius civile, was applicable only to Roman citizens. The
other, ius gentium, created through the edict of the perigrin praetor,
was a body of rules, partly Roman, partly foreign,13 published and
administered by him in controversies arising between non-citizens, or
between citizens and non-citizens. Among philosophers, however, ius
gentium had the broader meaning of a philosophical, legal system
composed partially of comparative jurisprudence, and partially of
rational speculation,14 with a universality probably more prophetic
than actual. Gaius, who wrote during the middle of the second century,
stressed the philosophical unity of ius gentium and natural law by
defining ius gentium as a law generally accepted by mankind because
of its natural reasonableness. 15 Ulpian at the close of the century dis-
10 DUNNING, POLITICAL THEORES, ANCIENT AND EDIAEVAL 127.
1 1 CICERO, DE LEGIBUS, Bk. I, VI.
12 CICERO, ON THE COMMONWEALTHi, supra note 7, Bk. IMI, XXII.
13 MuIpiEAD, AN OUTLINE oF RorAN LAW 16 (2nd ed.); MAINE, ANCIENT LAW
(Pollock ed.) ch. iii, pp. 52 if.
11 MUiRnIIAD, RoziAN LAW 226 (2nd ed.).
15 MUInEAD, THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS AND RUIES OF ULPiAN i,i; NUSSBAIr,
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF NATIONS 18-22.
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tinguished ius gentium from ius naturale. The latter, he said, was
taught by nature to all animals, while the former was used by the
various tribes of mankind.16 Carlyle, discussing the writing of Cicero
and Seneca, sees in this distinction a vague recognition among Romans
of the differences between natural law in the primordial Golden Age
and that which developed as ius gentium after the institution of civil
society: a doctrine familiar to the Church Fathers and to publicists of
a later date. 17 The extension in 212 A.D. of citizenship throughout the
empire brought ius civile and ius gentium into a single universal
system of Roman law.' 8
In addition to their ius gentium as opposed to the ius civile, the
Romans also distinguished between ius, which was traditional law con-
taining ideas of right and justice, connoting the ideal or divine, and
lex in the stricter sense of legislation. 19 The broader scope of ius which
included "all circumstances fair and right, as in the case of natural
law," 20 enabled jurists to rely upon reason and innate conviction of
right in the development of both ius civile and ius gentium. Slavery,
legal under the ius gentium, was prohibited by ius naturale, for by the
latter all men are born free,21 a tenet of the rights of man ordained by
nature,22 which is made explicit in the Declaration of Independence.
The fall of the Roman Empire in the west and the period of in-
tellectual decadence which followed, carried with them a similar
decline in knowledge and influence of Roman law. Toward the end
of the eleventh century, however, the revitalized interest in jurispru-
dence at Bologna and elsewhere revived the study of Roman law with
its infiltrated doctrine of stoic natural law. It was the work of these
medieval law schools, aided by the development of canon law in the
Roman Catholic church, that was mainly responsible for the general
European reception of Roman law. With the Roman system thus
firmly established, 23 the influence in Europe of the Stoa and its
doctrine of natural law was secured.
Modern American law owes several debts of ancestral lineage to
Cicero's ideal law of reason. First is the development of equity as
"right reason" in order to mitigate injustices which would result from
too rigorous an application of sheer legal rules. Another is the body
16 JUSTINIAN'S INsTrrTTs (Sandars trans.) 1,2,1; JUsTINIAN, THE DIGEST (Monro
trans.) 1,1.
17 1 CAuLYL, A HIsroRY OF EDIAEVAL POLITICAL THEORY IN THE WEST 38
and 42-44.
18 SOHmt's INSTITUTES OF ROMAN LAW (Ledlie) 46 and 47 (3rd ed.).
19 Id. at 116 f; MumHEAD, supra at 1, §7; SALMOND'S JURISPRUDENCE 517-521
(7th ed.).
20 DIGEST, supra, PAULUS, 1,1,11.
21 IusrnUTS, supra, 1,2,2; DIGEST, supra, 1,1,4; CARLYLE, supra at 40.
22 DUNNING, supra at 122 and 123.
23 MAuEAD, supra at 26-32.
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of international law which, though in modern dress is composed
largely of convention and custom, had its origin in the reason of
natural law and in the ius gentium of Rome. A third arose during the
expanding period of American law, when judges adopting English
rules to new environments, and regarding reason as well as custom as
the constituent elements of the common law, could consequently rely
not only upon their own training in legal reason for sources of new
doctrine, but could borrow freely from the civil law writers examples
of universal doctrine and reason. More recently modern legal writers
and judges, reacting against the rigid, syllogistic reasoning of common-
law judges, are recognizing anew the debt which legal rules owe to
the moral standards of the society which it is their duty to reflect as
well as to govern.
CHusTIAN DOCTRINE
Stoic legal theory, as it progressed from the so-called middle Stoa
at Athens, through the westernized eclectic stoicism at Rome exempli-
fied in the writings of Cicero, led directly to the formulation of
Christian legal doctrine. Each attributed divine origin to the reign of
law among men. Law derived from a god-head is of ancient origin,
and when kingship is joined with priesthood, the combination lends
supernatural sanction to the power of government. This device of
bolstering mundane rule with divine sanction was illustrated about
2250 B. C. in ancient Babylon where the bas-relief of a black diorite
monolith on which his code is engraved, portrays King Hammurabi
receiving the laws from the Sun God. Similarly Moses was instructed
by Yahweh and the sum of these revelations, preserved in the Torah,
the first five books of Moses, unites the law and theology of orthodox
Jews. Mohammedan and Hindu law lay claim to sacred origin; and in
a more recent era Joseph Smith credited divine revelation to the
Book of Mormon.
But Christianity has closer ties with stoicism than a similarity in
a law-giving deity. It was the goal of Christ's disciples to proselyte the
hellenized Roman world. To accomplish this challenge there was
need for a religion whose metaphysics also offered a satisfactory cos-
mology. This feature of Christianity was supplied through stoic in-
fluence on the gosples as evidenced in the prologue to the Book of
John, where the First Cause or beginning is described in the Greek
ontological agency of the Word, or logos-an exegisis later amplified
by Origen (c. 185 - c. 254). Further, in Paul's epistle to the Romans,
ii, 12 - 14, it is recognized that although the Gentiles do not have the
sacred law of the Jews, yet "when they do by nature the things con-
tained in the Law," they too act according to law. When under Con-
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stantine in 325 A. D. Christianity became the state religion of the
Roman Empire, centuries of stoic philosophy furnished the back-
ground for accepting its doctrine of a law of nature eminating from
God, even to including the perfection of its law in Eden before wordly
wisdom newly acquired by the first man and woman caused their
perpetual banishment from that unique and perfect state of nature.
In their writings the Church Fathers brought the spirit of Plato,
Aristotle, Ulpian, Seneca and Cicero into the Christian version of
civil and canon law. Origen, just referred to, Saint Ambrose (c. 340 -
397), Saint Jerome (340 - 420), Saint Augustine (354 - 430), Pope
Gregory the Great (c. 540 - 604), Isadore of Seville (c. 560 - 636), the
Decretum Gratianus on canon law (c. 1148) and the canonical Decre-
tal of Gregory IX (1234) assured their hellenization.
But it was Saint Thomas Aquinas (c. 1227 - 1274), building upon
Aristotle, whose Summa Theologia crystallized the philosophical con-
tent of Roman Catholic theology, and whose theory of law is today
having a neo-Thomist revival in Catholic law schools. Saint Thomas
predicated law upon a combination of two elements, reason and will.
Law is reason. Hence the will of the soverign has the force of law
only when it is in accord with some rule of reason. Law "is nothing
else than an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him
who has the care of the community, and promulgated."24 In this
sense, also, the volition of God flows from His divine reason. Since the
universe is governed by divine reason, the very idea of His govern-
ment has the nature of law; and since divine reason is timeless, His
law is eternal. Thus law becomes religion and religion becomes law.
The philosophy of the one is the philosophy of the other.
In addition to the lex aeterna which exists in God's mind, there
is the divine law of God which is revealed in the Bible, which forms
Saint Thomas' second category of law. Further, man participates in
God's eternal law through use of his reason, but because human rea-
son is fallible, he does so imperfectly. And since animals are not ra-
tional creatures, they do not share in this eternal law save "by way
of similitude." Natural law, then, the third category, embraces those
things to which man is inclined naturally. It is uniform in its general
principles, but may vary according to circumstances in their applica-
tion. Laws framed by man, that is, positive law, constitutes Saint
Thomas' fourth classification. In so far as laws are just, being de-
rived from natural or ultimately from eternal law, they are binding
upon the conscience. In so far as they deflect from natural law they
are but perversions of law. If they are unjust, because they are not
conducive to the common good, are improper as to authority or form,
24 THE Str A THEOLOGICA (The Fathers of the English Dominican Province
trans.) 8.
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or are opposed to divine law, they "must nowise be observed," for the
Apostle Peter has warned us that we "ought to obey God, rather than
man."
2 5
Saint Thomas' discussion of natural law is notable in two re-
spects. First, it is the vehicle through which Greek and Roman legal
philosophy is converted into Catholic dogma and preserved authori-
tatively for us today. Second, in Greek philosophy law was associat-
ed with reason and was impersonal. At Rome, through the agency of
the senate, the praetor, iudes and the responsa of opinions of
jurists, 2 6 this impersonal, philosophical reasoning of the Greeks be-
came part of a positive system of authoritative imperial law;27 or,
according to Dunning, law became "either a conclusion of reason or
an expression of will." 28 Saint Thomas combined reason and will in
his definition of law, both with reference to the law of God and of
man.2 9 It is a contribution to the definition of law which has never
lost its significance.
These distinctions are interesting in the transition of law in
legal theory from being in essence reason divine or secular to becom-
ing a sovereign's command as we find it in Austin's definition and in
the eventual positivism of modern legal thought. Within the Church
the Franciscan, Duns Scotus (c. 1265-1308) completed the transi-
tion. In accordance with Aristotelian tradition Saint Thomas believ-
ed that the will is dependent upon the intellect and knowledge of
the good. Duns Scotus on the contrary separated will from intellect
and made it supreme. God's will becomes His volition as distinguish-
ed from His intelligence. This difference paves the way for Hobbes
and the course of positivism against which modem scholasticism vig-
orously contends.30
Another English Franciscan, William of Occam (d. c. 1845) has
been criticised for furthering the theory of Duns Scotus, that will
rather than reason is the dominant characteristic of natural moral
law.3 1 He distinguished three classes of natural law. The divine law,
says Occam, is revealed in the old and new testaments. Natural law,
on the contrary, is not revealed, but is implanted by God in men's
hearts. First there is natural law which conforms to natural reason
25 AcTs 5 and 29. Cf. ANTIGONE, supra at - ; SUMMA TEOLOGICA, supra,
2,1, - 90-94.
26 BUCKLAND, A T=XBooc OF ROMAN LAW 22ff.
27 JUSTINIAN'S INSTITUTES, supra, 1,2,6.
28 "Quod principii placuit, legis habet vigorem." ULPIAN, Dimcr, supra, 1,
IV, 1.
29 DUNNING, supra at 192.
80 Anton-Herman Chroust, Hugo Grotius and the Scholastic Natural Law
Tradition, 17 THE NEv SCHOLASTICISM 101-112.
31 RO MMEN, THE NATURAL LAW 58 if, cf. Shepherd, William of Occam and the
Higher Law, 26 Amt. POL. SC. REV. 1005.
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and which cannot fail. Next is a natural law which exists only in an
ideal sense, and which consists of natural equity. This second divi-
sion of Occam's natural law corresponds to the mutable portion of
Aquinas'. Then there is a natural law in a third sense, which Occam
derives from his second category of pure natural law, and which is
found in ius gentium or any human act. That is, this third class con-
sists of those portions of the ius gentium or of human acts which are
ascertainable by evident reason.32
The significance of medieval preoccupation with natural law
theory is not purely theological. Positive law during the Middle Ages
was either custom or was derived from Roman civil law. There was
little constructive legislation. Government was admittedly subser-
vient to law, and all mundane power whether sacred or profane ulti-
mately came from God. Consequently, the sources and objectives of
law as they related to government were of fundamental importance.
Since philosophy was predominently scholastic, the views of the
schoolmen on the relation of church and state and on popular sovere-
ignty were practical and highly significant. The dependence of mod-
ern democracy upon legislation to implement its objectives may ob-
scure for us the dominance of speculative theory in a former age.
Climates of philosophical opinion which then were realities may ap-
pear naive to a subsequent people whose theories in turn have the
appearance of a new enlightenment.
The independent existence of law and the legal foundation of
the state with a mission to realize the ideals of law were once basic
assumptions. So were the distinctions which were drawn between
the divinely revealed laws of God, the mutable laws of nature, and a
ius gentium necessitated by the fall of man, derived partially from
natural law and partially from rules actually in use among nations.
While the state was considered to be above the rules of positive law
it was subject to natural law. Positive law or ius civile it could mod-
ify but it could not abrogate ius naturale. Herein lay the reconcilia-
tion of an otherwise irreconcilable conflict. Without it or a theory
of social contract the prince stood above all law. This reasoning is
the more persuasive when one postulates a final cause for which
man was created and a secular rule resulting from his fall. When
government neglects to embody in a constitution, written or un-
written, its basic assumptions regarding the relation of man to the
state, human rights and the natural law theory upon which they re-
ly are not matters of ideal speculation. Before the enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment as the positive law of the federal constitu-
tion, the doctrine of natural rights had an undisputed reality in
American politics and American law courts, too.
32 SHEPHERD, id. at 1008-1013; Pollock, The History of the Law of Nature:
A Preliminary Study, 1 COL. L. R-v. 11, 15 (1901).
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Thomas Aquinas perfected Church, natural law doctrine. Na-
tural law, derived from Divine law, is the source of the ius civile as well
as of the ius gentium. The City of God and the City of Man are united
through a common legal heritage. The precedent of pagan Rome
becomes Christian orthodoxy. Jurisprudence eminates from theology
as does all philosophy, and the rights of man are a religious heri-
tage. Protestantism and the rise of nationalism in Europe were
bound to affect the simplicity of this reasoning. As men's minds turn-
ed toward the objectivism of science and as empiricism replaced
metaphysics as a basis for research, rationalism and humanism evolv-
ed their conceptions of nature and its laws in derogation of Roman
Catholic orthodoxy, culminating during the eighteenth century in
the political theories of the Age of Reason. Hugo Grotius (1583-
1645), Dutch publicist and statesman, was the pioneer of the modern
era. He will be discussed later in connection with the development
of international law. First, though, it is desirable to consider the
state of nature out of which in theory arose civil society.
THE EVOLUTION OF CIVIL SOCIETY
Political theory of the Renaissance as well as of the Middle Ages
accepted the doctrine of a primordial existence of man in a state of
nature before the development of civil government. There was disa-
greement as to whether primitive man lived in comparative peace with
his neighbors or was harassed by an eternal striving for existence,
typified by a condition of war; just as there was disagreement as to
whether the standard of ethical conduct set for him in nature consti-
tuted law in an acceptable legal sense, or amounted to no more than
the prescript of religion or of the moral standards dictated by his
reason. While Christian doctrine regarded the Garden of Eden as a
historical fact, an original natural state of man was for some only an
assumption, the proof of which was unnecessary to establish. In
either event, from the hypothesis of a natural state, publicists evolved
the civil state via a divine mandate, an original contract or a sense of
social necessity.38 Rationalization solved the dilemma of ending with
absolute or popular sovereignty, according to the political views of
the writer. Implicit in the state of nature was a doctrine of natural
rights of man, whose survival in a civil state and for democratic
government depended upon the thesis to be served. We start with the
Englishman, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), well after the contract
theory had become ascendant.
In 1651 Hobbes published his Leviathan. It was a political tract
33 1 GmKE, NATURAL LAw AI-D THE THEORY OF SOCIETY (Barker trans.) 37.
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written during the Puritan Revolution in support of absolute sover-
eignty. He used the standard formula of a state of nature whose
existence, however, he did not attempt to prove. Man's innate drive
for power, his feeling of insecurity and his desire for glory result in a
constant striving among equals and a "bellum omnes contra
omnes." 34 In this natural state of war among all men in which each
man must defend himself, there is no distinction between right and
wrong or between justice and injustice. Lacking a common ruler
there is no law, and without law there is no justice.3 5 Law, by
Hobbes' definition requires civil government. It consists in the com-
mands of a sovereign. 36 In the natural state justice and gratitude, be-
ing simply dictates of reason concerning matters of equity, are mere-
ly rules of natural law. They do not properly become laws in any
accepted sense until they are adopted into the legal order of an or-
ganized state. Thereupon they and the civil law become branches of
the same legal system, civil law constituting the written and natur-
al law the unwritten part..T
In the war-like state of nature, Hobbes wrote, reason urges men
to adopt articles of peace. Precepts of nature in derogation of natural
liberty, he termed laws of nature. First among these is that men
should seek peace. Second is that for the sake of peace one should
be willing to forego his liberty or right to all things which was his
birthright in nature, and to accept such curtailment of his liberty
toward others as they in turn accept regarding him. A third law is
that men shall perform their covenants. 38
From this condition of nature and of natural law a common-
wealth arises, according to Hobbes, when a multitude of men, in or-
der to escape from the anarchy of nature, covenant among themselves
to forsake their natural liberty in favor of a sovereign, who will pro-
tect them and furnish them with an opportunity in peace to pursue
the means of commodious living.39 For the unrestrained license
in nature men substitute the perilous security of the civil state. In
return for this protection the sovereign whom they choose becomes
the legislator. Since the people in creating their civil society, by their
majority vote40 authorize their chosen monarch to act for them, it
follows that he, who is not a party to the contract, is above the law,
nor may they complain of injury or injustices from him.4 1 But since
34 LxEVATHm (ed. by Oakeshott) 64 and 82.
35 Id. at 83 and 84.
36 Id. at 173 and 179.
37 Id. at 104, 174, and 186.
38 Id. at 84, 85 and 93.
39 Id. at 84 and 113.
40 Id. at 113.
41 Id. at 173. For the distinction between a contract of society and a contract
of government see GERLKE, supra at 60 and infra PumuaNDoar at
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there now is a force within organized society for the enforcement of
rights, the refusal of a person to perform his convenants becomes an
injury or injustice, where before, in the state of nature, it was at most
a breach of a natural law moral duty. For injury of injustice to exist
in law there must be some coercive power to compel men through the
terror of punishment to perform their covenants. 42
Hobbes' doctrine of absolute sovereignty, based upon the fiction
of a social compact, is a foremost statement of the power concept of
government. For him the function of civil government is to furnish
and enforce the rules of life's contest. It is not to effect the end of
natural law as seen by the theologians, nor to make men virtuous as
Plato believed. 43 Law becomes the force of organized society - a
tenet with which Justice Holmes agreed.44 Since the sovereign is not
bound by the contract which brings the state into being, he is sub-
ject to no public law; and since civil governments themselves exist
only in an unorganized natural state, there is no super-legislature to
command order among nations.45 Hobbes' positive theory of law fore-
shadows much that is contained in analytical jurisprudence. But his
denial of a legal essence to natural law or to man's rights in nature
is contrary to the belief of most theologians; and his basic assump-
tion of man's egocentric spirit of self-interest is scarcely compatable
with Christian ethics. In short, Hobbes' civil state is a utilitarian or-
ganization of society founded upon an Epicurean doctrine of self-in-
terest and self-preservation: 46 a humanist conception of absolute
government rationally conceived, as distinguished from a metaphysi-
cal one of divine right of kings.47 It was to be expected that the
Leviathan would meet with criticism as well as with praise.
But as civil society may spawn from a natural state of war
through the logical device of a social compact by which men surren-
der their freedom in nature for the uncertain protection of an ab-
solute sovereign, so it may emerge by way of the family from a dis-
similar natural state of peace. In refutation of the Leviathan, Rich-
ard Cumberland (1631-1718), bishop of Peterborough, published in
1672 A Philosophical Inquiry into the Laws of Nature.4 8 All moral
and civil knowledge, he said, is founded upon natural law. These
laws may be proved inductively, which was the method used by Gro-
tius, or deductively from cause to effect, which was Cumberland's
42 LEVIATHAN, supra note 34, at 94.
43 DUNNING, supra at 276-281; HOLDSWORTH, supra vol. 6, 294-301.
44 Holmes, Path of the Law in CoLL CT LEGAL PAPERs 167.
45 HOBBES, supra at 85; GiaKE, supra at 97.
46 PUFENDORY, TE LAW OF NATURE AND OF NATIONS (Kennett trans. 4th ed.),
A HIsroRIcAL .AND CRrITcAL AccoUNT OF THE SCIENCE OF MORALITY, by BABEYRAC 80.
47 BRINTON, IDEAS AND MEN 854 and 355.
48 Contained in A TREATISE OF THE LAws OF NATURE (Maxwell trans. 1727).
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preference. 49 Rejecting Plato's theory of innate ideas, he reasoned
that the First Cause in the nature of things imprints certain practical
propositions upon our minds. These propositions, which are eternal-
ly true, carry with them rewards and punishments for their obe-
dience or neglect. Knowledge and observance of them contribute to
the natural perfection and happiness of our rational nature. Since,
then, laws are "nothing but practical propositions, with Rewards and
Punishments annex'd, promulg'd by competent authority," it follows
that the laws of nature satisfy this threefold requirement of true law;
they eminate from a law-giver, that is from God, are sanctioned by
rewards and punishments, and are promulgated5 ° by impression up-
on our minds. As true law, they exist without the necessity of a civil
society.
All the laws and the prophets, Cumberland wrote, rest upon the
first two commandments of the Bible: to love God with all thy heart,
and thy neighbor as thyself.51 The general laws of nature can be re-
duced to one universal one: "The endeavour to the utmost of our
power, of promoting the common Good of the Whole System of ra-
tional Agents, conduces, as far as in us lies, to the good of every Part,
in which our own Happiness, as that of a Part, is contained. But con-
trary Actions produce contrary effects, and consequently our own
Misery, among that of others."' 52 This was Cumberland's utilitarian
doctrine of benevolence or universal love, natural to man and reveal-
ed through his religion, the antithesis of Hobbes' theory of egoism,
upon which he based his political theories.
These laws of nature, said Cumberland, enjoin justice for all,
defined by Justinian as the giving to every man his due.53 For their
enforcement not only by rules but by punishment, reason dictates
the formation of civil government with sovereign power.54 The end
of government is, therefore, its cause, that is, the creation of an in-
strumentality "to enforce Observance of the Laws of Nature, to the
Honour of God, and the Happiness of Mankind, but especially of
those, who are Members of such Societies." 55 And that the common
good may be preserved, it is the nature of things ordained by the First
Cause, that property be distributed and protected; for there is
"given a natural Law to procure the Common Happiness of all."56
Hence the rights of subjects as well as of monarchs flow from the
49 Id. at 10.
50 Id. at 14.
51 Id. title page to A PHILOSOPHYCAL INQUIRY.
52 Id. at 16 and 56.
53 Id. at 19 and 21.
54 Id. at 348.
f5 Id. at 348 and 349.
56 Id. at 68 and 315.
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same command of nature to distribute property and protect it in the
common good.57
Mankind, according to Cumberland, is descended from one man
and one woman, and from this original parental authority emerge na-
tions and civil institutions.58 Government, thus, arose out of the
family and not out of a social compact. 59 Its objectives are limited as
well as formed by the laws of nature,60 which are stated in the Deca-
logue. Beyond the few and evident requirements, necessary for pro-
curing these purposes of government, nothing is prohibited the sup-
reme power. But since civil government arose as a dictate of reason
and a law of nature, it owes its origin to God. Hence its limits are
prescribed only by Him. But while nature circumscribes the prince's
poser, it does not follow that subjects may punish their ruler for
transgressing his authority. Punishment is the prerogative of God,
whose laws are broken, and this privilege He has not delegated to
man. Yet in constituting the supreme power of government the peo-
ple may reserve to themselves the right to resist a supreme magis-
trate who openly flounts the purposes of government.0 1 Thus the
king rules under God, but if he rules unjustly according to the ends
of government prescribed by God, his subjects may revolt. In this
manner Cumberland reconciled the authority of the prince with the
will of God toward men, and refuted the unlimited positivism of
Hobbes' social contract.62
More important to seventeenth and eighteenth century America
than the views of Thomas Hobbes and Bishop Cumberland on the
state of nature and the civil state which emerges from it, were the
political theories of John Locke (1632-1704). These he developed in
his Two Treatises on Government (1690). 63 In his first essay Locke
attacked the doctrine of divine right of kings as developed by Sir Ro-
bert Filmer (d. 1653) in an essay entitled Patriarcha, published
in 1680. This right, according to Filmer, God conferred upon Adam
in Eden. Through Noah and the patriarchs it descended to the abso-
lute governments of the world. In the second essay Locke set forth
his own theories of constitutionally limited government and of na-
tural rights.
Like his predecessors, Locke posited a natural state of man,
57 Id. at 325.
58 Id. at 307.
59 Id. at 507, 550 and 371.
60 Id. at 350.
61 Id. at 551 and n.
62 BRINTON, supra at 286-292.
63 And see his ESSAY CONCERNING HUmiAN UNDERSTANDING; HoLnsWoRTH, supra
vol. 6, at 276-290; BECKER, THE HEAVENLY CITY OF THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
PHmLOSOPHERS ch. 2.
[Vol. 13
THE LAW OF NATURE
which he may have considered to have been historically true.64 In
this state, illustrated by examples from America, men lived "together
according to reason, without a common superior on earth with auth-
ority to judge between them." 65 Liberty and not license was the rule,
since the natural state was subject to the rule of nature, that is of
reason, which teaches that no one should injure another "in his life,
health, liberty or possession. 66 Punishment for the infraction of this
law of nature was the executive privilege of each of its inhabitants.67
The defects of this natural state, Locke found to be the absence
of known laws, of an indifferent judge, and of the power to enforce
sentence. Because of these needs which organized society furnish, men
are willing to forego their freedom in a natural state of peace.68 Civil
government results from an agreement among members of a natural
state to abide by the determinations of their majority, and this agree-
ment is binding not only upon them but upon all those who subse-
quently unite themselves under it.69 But since men surrender their
liberties in return for the better protection of their natural rights
which organized society affords, it follows that those in power must
rule according to established law;70 and that while the person of the
prince is inviolate, yet the people may resist an unlawful abuse of
power. 7 '
The chief end of government for Locke is the protection of
property, which he defines broadly to include man's natural rights
to "life, liberty and estate." 72 Hence the purpose of legislation is to
supply the defects which "made the state of nature so unsafe and un-
easy."7 3 While legislative power is supreme in civil society, even here
men's actions must conform to nature's laws.74 There can be no abso-
lute power of government, nor may anyone be arbitrarily deprived of
his property or be taxed without the consent of the people.75
Locke considered legislative power to be fiduciary and account-
able to the people, who may transcend it by use of force when there is
a breach of trust by the sovereign.76 He separated the executive func-
tion of government from and made it inferior to the legislative. Or-
64 Fmsr TR.ATnm §§14 and 15.




69 Id. §§95-97 and 120.
70 Id. §§134 and 136.
71 Id. §§205-208.
72 Id. §§87, 123, and 135. DUNNING, supra at 349-353.
73 SECOND TREATIsE ON CIVIL GovERNMENT, supra §131.
74 Id. §135.
75 Id. §§138 and 140.
76 Id. §§149, 204, 206 and 208.
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dinarily the executive is charged with the conduct of foreign affairs,
termed "federative power." 77 In addition to executive power, the
sovereign is vested with a royal prerogative to act in absence of the
legislature. 78 This doctrine of inherent executive power in a sense
forecasts the theory advanced by Theodore Roosevelt, who main-
tained that the President possesses his powers as custodian of the
people, and that his executive power is "limited only by specific re-
strictions and prohibitions in the Constitution or imposed by Con-
gress under its constitutional powers." 79 In 1951 the debate again
waged between the President and the Congress over the extent of
the presidential powers.
The institution of private property Locke founded in nature.
Hence it precedes civil society. God, he believed, gave the world to
men in common, but enjoined them to labor in order to exist, intend-
ing the earth and the fruits of it for "use of the industrious and ra-
tional."8 0 By removing portions from the common supply man mix-
es it with his labor, thus reducing it to his own. The laborer is entitl-
ed to the objects of his toil -- "at least where there is enough and as
good left in the common for others."8 ' The natural right to appro-
priate to one's own use includes land as well as its produce, for while
in nature the measure of appropriation from the community is the
need of the appropriator, private cultivation of land is justified be-
cause it increases the common stock.8 2 Land value results largely
from the labor that is put into it. Money as a commodity vastly ex-
tends the disproportionate use that may properly be made of land;
and by common consent private ownership- of land is enlarged far be-
yond the limits authorized by the natural right of appropriation.8 3
Originally intended as a justification for a limited sovereignty
and the guarantee of individual rights of man which it is the func-
tion of civil government to protect, Locke's theories, founded upon
nature and a peaceful existence of man, have supported not only the
aims of the Founding Fathers, but the rise of capitalistic democracy
in industrial America. For him the purpose of civil government was
to protect man in his natural rights, and to establish the rules by
which disputes regarding these rights should be measured. He stood
for constitutionalism, individual liberties and ownership of private
property, government by consent of the governed, and the right of
revolution, a doctrine made more famous for us by Thomas Jeffer-
17 Id. §146.
78 Id. §160.
79 ROOSEVELT, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 388 and 389.
80 SECOND TREATISE, supra §§25, 26, 30, 32 and 34.
81 Id. §§28 and 44.
82 Id. §§36 and 39.
83 Id. §50.
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son and recognized by Abraham Lincoln in his first inaugural ad-
dress.8 4 In the dispute regarding the supremacy of the executive over
the legislature, his experience with English monarchy caused him
to cast the weight of his argument in favor of the legislature, and
his views in support of representative government documented the
proclamation of the colonies that there should be "no taxation with-
out representation."
The first direct effect in colonial America of Locke's views on
government, however, concerned not property rights but religious
toleration. This guaranty he incorporated into The Fundamental
Constitution of Carolina (1669), which he drafted for Lord Ashley,
his patron and chief colonial proprietor.8 5 The same organic law
stated that "it shall be a base and vile thing to plead for money or
reward," and required of all but near kinsmen who pleaded another's
cause in court an oath "that he doth not plead for money or reward, nor
hath nor will receive, nor directly nor indirectly bargained with the
party whose cause he is going to plead, for money or any other reward
for pleading his cause."8 6
Curtailment of lawyers' remuneration in the trial of cases was not
long lived, and the right of revolution has given way to one of con-
stitutional change by means of the ballot. Further, the social view of
private property and the distinction between personal and property
rights that are daily becoming more vocal, reminds us that the
premise of Locke's labor theory was God's gift of the earth to men in
common. From this assumption Jefferson drew the conclusion that
the earth belongs to the living rather than to the dead.87 And it was
Thomas Paine who called Jefferson's attention to the generic distinc-
tion between rights of personal competency, such as "thinking, speak-
ing, forming and giving opinions," which need no exterior assistance to
be enjoyed, and rights of personal protection, "of acquiring and pos-
sessing property," asserting that man retained the former when he
entered the civil society; it was only the latter, or defective rights in
nature, which he surrendered under the social contract in exchange for
civil rights.8 8 But Locke's argument in support of the legislature in its
contest for power with the executive is a perennial one in Washington;
and his faith in representative, constitutional government remains the
basic tenet of American democratic government.
84 2 Co,,rIvLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAm LINCOLN 1 at 6 (Nicolas and Hay ed).
85 SECOND TRATsE, supra at -xxiii; 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
COLONIAL CHARTERS AND ORcANIC LAWs 1669, §109 (Poore ed.).
86 Id. §70.
87 Jefferson to James Madison, Paris, Sept. 6, 1789; 5 THE WRITNGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 115 at 12 (Ford ed.); Paine, The Rights of Man in 1 THE CoiirLmF
WRMNGS OF THOMAs PAINE 251 (Foner ed.).
88 Paine to Jefferson, 1789, WRITINGS, id. vol. 2 at 1298.
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Another eighteenth century writer of importance to Americans is
Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu (1689-1755). Like
his predecessors in political theory, in The Spirit of the Laws (1748)
Montesquieu began his reasoning with a state of nature. His natural
man was weak and obsessed with fear.8 9 A desire for peace, for nourish-
ment and for companionship explains his preference to live in
society.9 0 Only upon entering civil society did he overcome his sense
of weakness. Then equality ceased and war began between states and
also between men. These two conditions of war gave rise to positive
law.9 1
Montesquieu defined laws in their most general meaning as "the
necessary relations arising from the nature of things."9 2 Positive law
consists of human reason by which men work out these relations. They
should be in accord with the climate, soil and occupation of the
natives, with their religion and wealth, and also with the degree of
liberty which they enjoy. The sum of these relations constitutes the
spirit of the laws.9 3 His positive law, then, results from the impact of
external forces upon man.9 4 It changes "as the will of man changes." 95
His study of their spirit is empirical and his method is comparative.
Although in a democracy people appear to do what they please,
political liberty is not unlimited freedom. On the contrary in a govern-
ment under law, liberty is simply "a right of doing whatever the law
permits." It can only consist "in the power of doing what we ought to
will, and in being constrained to do what we ought not to will."'9 6
Consequently the limits which this conception of liberty imposes, are
prescribed by the nature of the state.
As it relates to the constitution of a democratic state, wrote
Montesquieu, political liberty requires the executive to be separate
from the legislative and to exercise a check upon its actions. The
legislature, too, should be independent, composed of a body of nobles
and of one which represents the people. The judiciary, which Montes-
quieu considered "in some measure next to nothing,"97 in turn should
be separate from the other two branches of government, thus he pro-
posed both a separation of powers and a doctrine of checks and
balances.9 8
Regardless of whether, as some have said, The Spirit of the laws
89 1 THE SUTx OF Tm LAws (Nugent trans.) 4.
99 Id. at 4 and 5.
91 Id. at 5.
92 Id. at 1.
93 Id. at 6 and 7.
94 MAiNE's ANCIENT LAW 125 (Pollock ed.).
95 THE Srr oF TiE LAws, supra vol. 2 at 59.
96 Id. voL 1 at 150.
97 Id. at 156.
98 Id. at 151-162.
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was inspired by an inaccurate appraisal of English constitutionalism,
Montesquieu's scheme of checks and balances in government, through
the medium of an independent legislature, executive and judiciary,
supported the form of government adopted in the Constitution. His
theory of legislation as the prerogative of the legislature, subordinates
the policy-making function of the executive to a degree repudiated by
modern experience. When rigidly applied it also reduces the judicial
process to one of logical application of legal rules. This recalls the
attitude of Justice Holmes toward legislative experimentation and
Justice Stone's trenchant reminder to the Supreme Court of the need
for exercising a "sense of self-restraint" when passing upon the con-
stitutionality of legislation. 99 Although stated by Montesquieu with
reference to civil law, his theory is also directly applicable to the
function of courts of common law, and would deny to them the
privilege and duty of conforming legal rules to the needs of social
change. The Spirit of the Laws is an important and pioneering work
in comparative, sociological jurisprudence, yet Montesquieu's doctrine
of separation of powers and of legislative control of policy-making is
the language of analytical jurisprudence, and his curtailment of the
judicial function is contrary to the duty conferred upon it today by
sociological jurisprudence. 0 0
The importance of these seventeenth and eighteenth century
writers on government does not lie in the historical accuracy or in-
accuracy of their divergent theories. Absolutism versus popular govern-
ment, however, concerns issues which are as urgent now as when
Hobbes wrote. As in England so in America it was Locke's thesis with
its respect for individual rights and limited power of government that
served as a guide. And Montesquieu's framework, even though pro-
posed for monarchy, offered greater allure than the divine prerogative
of kingship descending from Adam. But since the enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, Hobbes' doctrine of
positivism and of the separation of ethical theories from actual legal
rules has gained the ascendancy in jurisprudence. In the state of
nature there is sufficient diversity for publicists, lay or clerical, to dis-
cover the rational source of whatever form of the political community
that is desired. Today, the function of government, its attitude to-
ward the individual, toward his property and toward his various
freedoms is more rarely discussed in terms of the conditions under
which man lived prior to the institution of civil society, than it was
during the Age of Reason. It is interesting to note, though, that now
even as during the days of social contract, constitutions, state and
federal, with their provisions for amendment, just as modern pro-
99 United States v. Butler, 297 US. 1, 79 (1936).
100 THE SPRI oF THE LAWS, supra at lxvii.
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posals for world government, attest to the theory of convention as a
source, and of government by the consent of the governed as the
function of civil institutions. 101
lus Naturale AND lus Gentium
Concepts of natural law, of the state and of the rights of man,
developed by the Church Fathers and ultimately by Saint Thomas
have survived to the present in the environment of the church which
reared them. But they were not to continue unchallenged as the ulti-
mate interpretation of nature. This was inevitable as Protestantism
developed its varying creeds, as nationalism rose to contest the dom-
inance of the Church, and as rationalism and humanism turned men's
thoughts from metaphysical explanations to a reasoned consideration
of man as a social phenomenon. While Christianity remained as the
ultimate explanation and the state of nature as the point of origin,
gradually emphasis shifted from the supernatural to the natural, and
the nature of man substituted for revelation as the hypothesis for
discovering the will of God, regarding the proper ordering of his
universe. The shift in approach among political writers of the sixteenth
through the eighteenth centuries was discussed in the preceding
section. It is further illustrated in the field of international law, be-
ginning with Hugo Grotius, who is sometimes credited both as being
the founder of the subject and the author of modern conceptions of
natural law.
Grotius (1583-1645), the Dutch publicist, though not the first
to develop international law, was at least its first great systematizer.
Writing during the Thirty Years War, he sought to discover and record
the rules of law which should govern the actions of nations in peace
and in war. He began, as was the custom, with the natural state of
man, of which America furnished an example. In it there was a com-
munity of property. 10 2 Later this common use of things was prevented
by the dispersal of peoples over the earth and by want of justice.10 3
Thereafter the basis of dominion over property became a pact, express
or implied, or tacit as by occupation. 10 4 From the inability of families
to protect themselves states developed, as free men through agreement
formed associations for the enjoyment of law, and for mutual utility.10 5
So long as the sovereign of such a state does not transgress the divine of
101 COHEN, THE MEANING OF HuzfAN HISTORY 238-245.
102 GRoTius, DE JuPE BELLI r PAcIs (Whewell trans. 1625), 2,2,2,1.
103 Id. at 2, 2, 2, 4.
104 Id. at 2, 2, 2, 5; 2, 2, 3, 3.
105 Id. at 1, 4, 7, 3; 1, 1, 14, 1.
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natural law, his subjects are bound to obey him. 06
Grotius distinguished between natural law and three types of
positive law: divine law, civil law and ius gentium.'o 7 He carefully
disavowed any intention to depart from the accepted belief in God as
the ultimate source of all law.' 08 The divine law to which all must
submit was given to man at the time of the creation, following the
deluge and at the coming of Christ. 0 9 This recognition of God as the
finite source of law is important because of its bearing upon Grotius'
conception of natural law, as he shifted from a purely scholastic ap-
proach to one of humanism.
The source of natural law, according to Grotius, is the social being
of mankind desirous of living in a condition of tranquility. Human
nature is the mother of right, or natural law, which leads to a desire
for human society." 0 Natural law "is the Dictate of Right Reason, in-
dicating that an act, from its agreement or disagreement with the
rational and social nature of man has in it a moral turpitude or a
moral necessity; and consequently that such act is forbidden or com-
manded by God, the author of nature.""' Reason, Grotius believed,
directed toward the social objective of the human race as ordained by
God, produces natural law. This law is so immutable that even God
cannot change it. Indeed, if it were possible for there to be no God,
there would still be a natural law, based upon reason in the further-
ance of man's social existence."12
This famous statement by Grotius regarding the immutability
of natural law has been explained as merely an emphasis placed upon
the reason of God, as distinguished from his will, as the source of
law;"13 and as a reliance upon reason as the means for discovering
God's will in the absence of revelation.1 4 As a use of man's reasoning
power to interpret the needs of society, it is indicative of humanism
as distinguished from scholasticism in the development of the natural
law concept. It justifies property rights as well as contract rights for
their tendency to conserve society; and rejects utility in favor of
human nature as the source, as distinguished from an enforcing
factor, of natural rights. He founded civil laws upon the obligation
of mutual compacts. But since compacts in turn derive their force
from nature, it may be said that nature, if not the mother, at least is
106 Id. at 1, c. 4.
107 Id. at 1, 1, 13, 1.
108 Id. Prologue at 61.
109 Id. Prologue at 13; 1, 1, 15, 2.
110 Id. Prologue at 5-8.
111 Id. at 1, 1, 10, 1, as modified by Barbeyrac, and 1, 1, 12, 1.
112 Id. Prologue at 11; 1, 1, 10, 5.
113 Chroust, Hugo Grotius and the Scholastic Natural Law Tradition, 17 TnE
NEw SCHOLAsr.icIsMa 101 and 125.
114 1 BURLAMAqut, THE PPuNCIPAI oF NATURAL LAw (Nugent trans.) 151.
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a proximate ancestor of civil law. The geneology is human nature,
natural law and then civil law.115
It was to ius gentium that Grotius turned for the development of
international law. While natural law was discovered through the
agreement of reason with the' social nature of man, ius gentium, he
said arose from usage. It was the universal or nearly universal law of
nations, discovered in its use and by the testimony of experts and
savants. 116 With the Romans ius gentium was a customary, private
law for foreigners, which, during the later period of general Roman
citizenship, acquired a philosophical and theoretically universal con-
tent. By Grotius' time the need for a public law among nations led to
an alteration in the meaning of the term ius gentium to meet this
requirement. He distinguished it from natural law, but recognized
that despite its origin in common usage by nations, it no more than
ius naturale could rest solely upon utility."iT Just as the Roman /us
gentium grew to approach the quality of natural law, so the require-
ment of selection among competing international standards forbad
the acceptance of all such practices as "truly and universally lawful.""u 8
Indeed, Grotius' purpose in writing his treatise was to moralize as
well as to standardize the rules of peace and war among nations. Al-
though the immediate source of his international law was the common
usage or will of nations,119 it would seem that just as in the case of
civil law the common ancestor of his ius gentium, too, was natural law.
Dunning says that by general consent Grotius' work laid the founda-
tions of international law as a science "in which is to be found the
perfect fruit of the doctrine of the law of nature."' 20 It was a system of
international law founded upon the principles of morality as evi-
denced in the socially acceptable international practices of the
Christian world.1 1 His starting point for natural law in social im-
pulse as distinguished from revelation on the one hand, and utility or
individual self-advantage on the other, offered a fresh and humanistic
approach to natural law, too. On this score it would scarcely be dis-
puted by Leon Duguit with his thesis of social solidarity as the source
of law,'2 2 or by Harold Laski, who considered rights as those con-
ditions of social life which man needs for the attainment of his better
self.123
115 DE JurE Bras. r PAcis, supra Prologue at 16.
116 Id. at 1, 1, 14, 2.
117 Id. Prologue at 18.
118 Id. Prologue at 41; 1, 1, 12, 1.
119 Id. at 1, 1, 14, 1 and 2.
120 DUNNING, PoLrrIcAL THEoRus FRom LUTHER To MONTESQUIEU 153.
121 Id. at v.
122 Duguit, Theory of Objective Law Anterior of the State, 7 MODERN FRENCH
LEGAL PHLOSOPHY SERIES ch. X, §179.
128 LASts, A GRAMmAR oF PoLrCS 91.
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Grotius based his treatise on the social nature of man; Hobbes
accented man's egoism. These divergent viewpoints produced cor-
responding contrasts in their objectives of government. Pondering on
these differences, Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694), the German jurist, in
1660 wrote an essay entitled Elements of Universal Jurisprudence.
Twelve years later, following professorships on the Law of Nature at
the Universities of Heidelberg and Lund, he published his Law of
Nature and Nations. In it he rejected Hobbes' warring state of nature
for one of peace, though insecure, existing as a prehistoric fact only
in the qualified sense of a very primitive society.124 In this state of
nature men lived in family groups. The true cause of civil government
he considered to be the desire of the heads of these families to protect
their kinsmen from injuries which one man is in danger of sustaining
from another. 125 For this purpose civil society is the best safeguard
that can be conceived or invented. 126
Pufendorf also rejected Hobbes' theory of a single social contract
by which man both created the civil state and surrendered his rights in
nature to an absolute sovereign. In place of the single contract he ad-
vanced the theory of a two-fold contract. In the first of these men
agreed among themselves upon a form of government. In the second
the ruler and the ruled provided for their mutual rights and duties.
127
Pufendorf disagreed with Grotius' conception of a natural law in
the absence of God,12 8 but agreed with him that natural law is the
result of man's societal tendency. God, he believed, created man as a
social animal, with the duty imposed upon him to observe those laws
discoverable by his reason, which further his preservation and the
objects of his creation. Reason is not the law of nature, but is the
means of its discovery.129 Following Hobbes, Pufendorf made no dis-
tinction between the natural law of man and of states, denying to either
of them a positive existence as law in the Hobbesian sense. 130 By this
analysis natural law is a societal product, possessed of an ethical con-
tent, dignified with a sanction, though remote, of God's will, but
lacking the legal force of an ordinance of a superior power.
His treatise, devoted primarily to the subject of international law,
together with commentaries by Babeyrac, was for many years a
standard text, translated into many languages, including English. It
124 PUFENDORF, THE LAw OF NATURE AND NATIONS (Kennett trans. 4th ed.
1728) 2, 2, 4 ff.
125 Id. at 7, 1, 7.
126 Id. at 7, 1, 8.
127 Id. at 7, 2, 7 and 8.
128 Id. at 2, 3, 19.
129 Id. at 2, 3, 15 and 20.
130 Id. at 2, 3, 23; See NUSSBAUn, A CONCISE HisroRY OF THE LAWS OF NATIONS
114-118.
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was published in the same year as Bishop Cumberland's De Legibus
Naturae, which in later editions Pufendorf cited with approval.
To these writings of protestant jurists on international law should
be added that of Jean Jacques Burlamaqui (1694-1748), counselor of
state for Switzerland and for fifteen years honorary professor of natural
and civil law at Geneva. In 1747 his Principles of Natural Law was
published, followed in 1751 by The Principles of Politic Law. Bur-
lamaqui pursued the best traditions of his predecessors in developing
his system of natural law. God, the first cause of unmoved mover of
Aristotle's metaphysics, is the ultimate source of law.' 3 ' He created
man as a social being endowed with an innate moral sense and with
an ability to reason. Because the Divine Will is based upon Divine
Reason, 13 2 man may ascertain its objectives toward himself through
the use of reason and an innate moral sense.133 Hence those rules of
reason which are conducive to man's preservation, perfection and
happiness as a social being' 34 are natural laws-that is laws which are
derived from the nature of man and from *his relation to other be-
ings.' 35 Since there is a moral obligation to obey what is reasonable,
natural law is sanctioned both by reason and by God's will and should
be obeyed.' 36 The existence of this law is universal 13 7 and its ob-
servance produces happiness. 138 While with Hobbes, Burlamaqui con-
sidered the law of nations to be only a division of naturaf law, 39 he
recognized a distinction between a necessary, universal law of nations
which is part of natural law, and an arbitrary one dependent upon
convention. On this basis he reconciled his position with that of
Grotius. 40
During Burlamaqui's lifetime another Swiss jurist was writing
on natural and international law. This was Emeric de Vattel (1714-
1767), who in 1758 published his Law of Nations or Principles of the
Law of Nature applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sov-
ereigns. The chief merit of this work consisted in its presenting the
viewpoint of Christian Wolff (1679-1754) on the subject. Wolff was
a German philosopher and mathematician, whose work on Jus Natur-
ale and Jus Gentium appeared between 1740 and 1749. With Grotius
and contrary to Hobbes and Pufendorf, Vattel, following Wolff, dis-
tinguished the law of nations from that of nature. States, said Vattel,
131 BURLAMAQUI, supra vol. 1 at 90.
132 Id. at 129.
123 Id. at 142 and 143.
134 Id. at 112, 113 and 117.
135 Id. at 109 and 112.
136 Id. at 130, 145, 150 and 184.
'37 Id. at 131.
138 Id. at 185, 187 and 188.
139 Id. at 136.
140 Id. at 137 and 138.
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are associations of persons who mutually engage to procure their com-
mon welfare.' 4 1 Such societies are recommended to men by the law of
nature as the true means of supplying their wants.142 They are moral
persons, and like individuals states, too, should live in a manner which
is conformable to nature.143 Although the sovereign lives above the
penal law and his person is inviolate, 144 yet his powers are limited by
the fundamental law on which the state is based,' 43 and he may be
called to account for acts of tyranny.' 46
lus gentium, Vattel said, was originally only the law of nature
applied to nations, with such differences as result from the substitu-
tion of nations for individuals. This law contains its own internal
justification. It is a necessary law of nations, so called because nations
are bound in conscience to obey it. It is immutable because it consists
of immutable natural laws. 147 In addition to this body of internal or
natural law of nations, there is an external or positive law which pro-
ceeds from the volition of nations. This is partly a voluntary law,
resting upon the presumed consent of nations, to which they submit as
rules of common welfare and safety;148 partly conventional, based upon
express consent; and thirdly customary, proceeding from their tacit
consent.140
Vattel forms a link between the older works on international law
and modem ones, which base the law of nations upon custom, con-
vention and agreement. His Law of Nations was a widely read treatise,
translated into English in 1760.150
From the standpoint of American natural law theory the impor-
tance of these writers of the Reformation on the law of nations is two-
fold. First, while they were wholly religious in their acceptance of
God as the ultimate source of law, they broke from scholastic tradition
in their method of developing the natural law out of which arose civil
government and international law. Stressing the social nature of man
and his reason as the primary element of natural law, they expressed
the humanism of their period, in contrast to the metaphysics of a
purely theological approach to government and law. Second, their
works were read by American statesmen and lawyers, and were quoted
by judges seeking in the precedents of comparative law, to sustain the
141 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS bk. 1, §§l and 16.
142 Id. §16.
143 Id. §11 and Preliminaries §2.
1-14 Id. bk. 1, §§49 and 50.
145 Id. §§45 and 50.
146 Id. §51.
147 Id. at 2, 3, xii.
118 Id. at xii.
149 Id. at 7 and 8.
150 STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAw 231, n. 49.
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new and fragil framework of an incipient common law.151 In the
specialized field of international law they added their testimony to the
thesis that reason and nature can supply man with a philosophy of
international relations, as well as with rules by which those relations
can be administered. Unless the ius gentium, like the ius naturale, has
the force of positive law, nations are bound only by convention, and
otherwise exist in a world of international anarchy. In so far as these
writers countenanced a universal law among nations similar to one for
individuals, they were laying a foundation not only for their own
time,152 but for periods when international tribunals of the future,
whether of peace or war, should ponder the existence of international
law,15 8 and when assemblies of nations should turn to the problem of
international bills of rights. Definitions of law from this standpoint
have more than academic importance. 154
From these European writers on international law the shift now
is to England, and to the influence which natural law theory had on
the development of the common law.
ENGLISH LAW AND LEGAL WRrrERS
England had no general reception of Roman civil law, and thL
weight to be accorded its influence by the presence of Roman military
forces prior to their withdrawal in 410 A. D. is problematical. Even
so, the ethical theory of Roman-law doctrine is manifest in the de-
velopment of the common law.155 In 597, Aethelbert, King of Kent,
having married Bertha, the Christian daughter of Charebert, King of
Paris, received at Canterbury a mission of Roman Catholic priests
from Gregory the Great. This mission was headed by Augustine, who
became the first archbishop of Canterbury. Christianity was reintro-
duced into England,' 56 and a few years later Aethelbert in Roman
fashion issued his code of laws (c. 602), the first to be written in the
English language. 15 7 The influence of Augustine upon the king is
disclosed in the opening list of fines of which the code is composed:
151 Pierson v. Post, 3 Caines 175, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (N.Y. 1805); Kent, An
American Law Student of a Hundred Years Ago in 1 SELECrED ESSAYS IN ANGLO-
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 837.
152 GERuo, supra at 96-102.
153 Lord Wright, Natural Law and International Law in INTE" rTAOrxONS OF
MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 794-807 (Sayre ed.).
154 WINFIELD, THE CHIEF SOURCES oF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY ch. IV.
155 Scrutton, Roman Influence in Chancery, Church Courts, Admiralty, and
Law Merchant in 1 SELECr ESSAYS ON ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 208.
156 PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COIMION LAw 8 (4th ed.).
157 2 HOLDSWORTH'S HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 14 and 19; MfAITAND AND MON-
TAGUE, A SKETcH OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 3 if.
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"The property of God and the church, twelve-fold; a bishop's property,
eleven-fold; a priest's property, nine-fold."'u5 It would appear that
the newly restored religion had not dispensed with the need of a strict
and enforceable criminal code.
More than five centuries after Augustine arrived in England,
Theobald (d. 1161), archbishop of Canterbury, summoned to his
household-which already included John of Salisbury and Thomas
Becket'r 9-Vacarius, a Bologonese canonist and civilian. About the
year 1149 Vacarius introduced the teaching of Roman law at Oxford,
and wrote his Leber Pauperum, which was a compilation of nine books
of Justinian's Digest and Code,160 intended for the use of students.
King Stephen suppressed Vacarius' teaching of civil law,161 and in
1234 Henry III forbad it to be taught in London. Later John Wycliffe
(c. 1320-1384) proposed that it be replaced at Oxford and Cambridge
by a study of English law. 162 Nevertheless its instruction persisted 63
and not long after Reginald Pole (1500-1558), archbishop of Canter-
bury and later cardinal, made his proposal for a complete reception of
civil law, Henry VIII (r. 1509-1547) founded professorships in the
subject at both universities.164 Meanwhile the celebrated De Legibus et
Consuetudinibus Angliae of Bracton (d. 1268), first published in 1569,
demonstrated the indelible effect which civil law had left both upon
the common law and upon those who steered its course in England.
But despite this intermittant imminence of a conquest of England by
civil law, Mathew Hale (1609-1676), the Lord Chief Justice, could
write in his History of the Common law,165 that except in ecclesiastical,
admiralty and military courts, the civil law was no more binding in
England than common law was binding in Rome.
From Aethelbert to Danute, the Dane (995-1035), a succession of
codes by Kentish and West Saxon kings illuminated by specific pro-
visions the growing importance of the clergy in addition to the Witan,
or council of wise men, in the proclaiming of royal dooms.1 66 King
Alfred (r. 871-901) introduced his code with a series of directives both
158 THORPE, ANCIENT LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS OF ENGLAND 1.
159 GREEN, A SHORT HIsroRY OF THE ENGLISH PEOPLE 133 (rev. ed.); 1 POLLocK
AND MATLAND, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW ch. 5 (rev. ed.).
1130 THE LIERE PAUPERUM OF VACARIUS, SELDEN SOCITY, vol. 44, intro. vx, xxi.
161 Selden, Ad Fletam, CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN LEGAL HISTORY 109 ff.
162 Maitland, English Law and the Rennaissance in 1 SELECT ESSAYS ON ANGLO-
AMEIUAN LEGAL HISTORY 178; POUND, Tns SPIRIT OF THE COmmON LAv 39.
163 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND intro. §1, pp. 18 ff.
(Colley ed.).
164 Maitland, English Law and the Rennaissance in I SELEGT ESSAYS ON ANGLO-
AimcAN LEGAL HISTORY 173-176; WINFIELD, supra at 59; PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE
ISTORY OF THE CommoN LAw 43 and 44 (6th ed.).
165 HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE Coa moN LAW? 24 (6th ed.).
166 THORPE, supra; HOLvSWoRTH, supra vol. 9 at 12-25.
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ecclesiastical and lay, advising his subjects that "these are the dooms
which the Almighty God himself spake unto Moses, and commanded
him to keep."' 6 7 In Aethelstan's code tithes are prescribed "with the
advice of my Archbishop, Wulfhelm, and of my other bishops also."'168
The Norman conquest of England by William the Conqueror in
1066 would not be expected to interfere with the Roman-Christian
influence upon the development of English common law, and might
in fact strengthen that influence.169 Doubtlessly civil law was studied
at Canterbury and York before Vacarius began his Oxford lectures. 170
In the field of canon law the Decretum Gratianus (c. 1148), even
though not official, the compilations of decretals authorized in 1234
by Gregory IX, and the eventual Corpus Juris Canomici facilitated
the study and practice of church law in ecclesiastical courts. 17 ' Disputes
within the Church arising from the views of Duns Scotus (c. 1265-
1308) and William of Occam (d. c. 1349) only emphasize the im-
portance of theological, natural law as an ingredient of the English
common law. Its influence in law texts is noted from the time of the
Norman conquest.
The Conquest marked the end of the Anglo-Saxon reign and the
beginning of a transition from Kentish and West Saxon dooms to the
rise and development of the English system of common law. King
William imposed the Norman feudal system upon England, but
promised to uphold the laws of Edward the Confessor, whose lawful
successor he claimed to be.' 7 2 In one respect the Christian-Roman in-
fluence of the Church was directly affected by the Conquest. This was
the result of William's ordinance which decreed the separation of lay
and ecclesiastical jurisdiction. In Anglo-Saxon times the hundred
courts heard both spiritual and temporal offenses, and the presence of
the bishop as a member of the court could scarcely have diminished
the influence of Christian as well as of Roman doctrine in the decision
of cases. An attempt by Henry I to restore the old order met with the
disapproval of the Church.' 7 3The development of a separate ecclesias-
tical jurisdiction followed, accompanied by the study and application
of canon law, aided by its systematic treatment in the canonical com-
pilations, to which reference was just made. 174
167 THORPE, supra at 25; TuK, THE LEGAL CODE OF AELFRED THr GREAT 50 - 48.
168 Id. at 82.
169 BLACKSTONE, supra bk. I, ch. 5.
170 See HOLmSWORTH, supra vol. 2 at 176-178.
171 PLUCKNEr, supra at 287-289; MAMAND, CANON LAW IN THE CHURCH O-
ENGLAND; Stubbs, The History of the Canon Law in England in 1 SELECT ESSAYS IN
ANGLO-AmERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 248-288.
172 1 REEvEs, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 56 ff. (Finlason ed.).
178 BLACESTONE, supra bk. 3, ch. 5 pp. 63.
174 PLUCKNETr, supra at 287-289; MAITLAND, CANON LAW IN THE CHURCH OF
ENGLAND.
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In another way, however, the Church maintained its influence
upon the developing English legal system. This was through the
chancellor and the gradual evolution of his jurisdiction from one of
administration to one of a curia, and eventually to the creation of
equity as a coordinate system of judicial control, supplementing the
common law. Beginning with Edward the Confessor (1013-1066)175
and continuing until the appointment of Sir Thomas More in 1529, the
chancellor was an ecclesiastic, trained in canon and civil but not in
common law.176 An archbishop or cardinal in the chancellor's seat
rendered justice according to the law of God or reason, or the law of
the land if compatible with God's law or reason. These bodies of
doctrine formed the basis for the rules which guided his conscience.' 77
Law texts during early Norman times harked back to the Anglo-
Saxon period and add no light to the philosophical influences which
were shaping English common law.178 But native insular law was form-
ing, and its first important text, written in Latin, is attributed to
Ranulph de Glanvill (c. 1130-1190), justice and prime minister to
Henry II, though it may have been partly at least the work of his
nephew, Hubert Walter, subsequently Chief Judiciar of England and
Archbishop of Canterbury.179 Its title is self-explanatory: "A Treatise
on the Laws and Customs of the Kingdom of England"; and then in
explanation: "The present work contains those Laws and Customs
only, according to which Pleas are determined in the King's Court, the
Exchequer, and before the Justices, wheresoever they may be." But
while basically Glanvill's treatise deals with the common law of the
courts, its breadth of scope and even some of its content are clearly
attributable to Roman civil and to cannon-law influence. Its preface
in form imitates that of Justinians' Institutes. 8 0
The second great treatise on English common law was probably
written between 1250 and 1258181 by Henry of Bratton (d. 1268), who
was justice of assize for Henry III and for a time was a judge of the
king's central court. Bracton's notebook, which in 1884 was discovered
by Vinogradoff and edited by Maitland (1889), contains transcripts of
about two thousand court rolls to which Bracton (or Bratton) as judge
had access. Upon this solid base of case law he wrote his volumous De
175 ENCYC. BRrr., CIANCELLOR.
176 REEVs, supra vol. 2 at 600 and 610. Mores services to the Church were
recognized in 1935 when he was canonized by Pope Pius X1.
177 Ibid, also vol. 3 at 396 and 400; HoLDswoRT, supra vol. 5 at 216.
178 POLLOCK AND MArTLAND, supra vol. 1 at 97-104.
179 Id. at 162-164; Maitland, Glanvill Revised, 6 HARv. L. REv. 1; HoLDS-
WORTH, supra vol. 2 at 189.
180 GLANVmL. (Beames trans.) n. 1 to Preface; HoLmswoaTH, supra vol. 2 at
203; REE Vss, supra vol. 1 at 256.
181 POLLOCK AND 'MWTLAND, supra at 207.
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Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae, which was firstpublished in 1569.
But the influence of Azo, the Bologonese glossator, and of canon law
was strong upon Bracton-which fact should not be unexpected of one
who later became in turn a parish rector, an arch-deacon and in 1264
chancellor of Exeter Cathedral. Accordingly Bracton found no difficulty
in viewing the king, though not inferior to his liegemen, as "subject to
God and to the law, for the law makes the king."' 8 2 Law, he considered
as simply "the common precept of prudent men in council," or "the
common warrant of the body politic." And, since God is the author of
justice, then right and law are synonymous-though custom through
long usage may fill the place of law.'8 8 Jurisprudence he defined, after
Justinian, as "knowledge of divine and human things, the science of
what is just and unjust."' 8 4 A "natural right is that which nature, that
is God himself, has taught all animals."' 8 5 The Christianized Roman
influence upon this ecclesiastical English jurist is apparent, regardless
of how justified may have been his divergence from actual case law for
philosophical support or for supplementing doctrine in producing
this "crown and flower of English medieval jurisprudence."'u8
Bracton's work was followed by several imitators.'8 7 In about
1290 Gilbert Thornton, Chief Justice of the King's Bench, produced
his Summa. 8  At about the same time (c. 1290) appeared the book
known as Fleta, which may have been written by a disbarred barrister
while an inmate of Fleet Prison. 8 9 And possibly in 1291 there was
Britton, which was an attempt to state in French the law as spoken by
King Edward I. Each of these texts was either an epitome of Bracton's
monumental work or was based upon it.190
These minor treatises derived from Bracton shed no additional
light upon the interplay between natural law philosophy and English
legal doctrine. This is not the case, however, with The Mirror of
Justices, which was probably from the pen of Andrew Horn (d.
182 1 DE LEGIBUS 39 (Twiss ed.).
183 Id. at 13.
184 Id. at 19. "Jurisprudence is the knowledge of things divine and human;
the science of the just and the unjust." JUSTINIAN'S INsTrrTEs (Sandars trans.) 1,
1; ULPIAN, DImGsT 1, 1, 10.
185 DE IGiBus, supra at 23.
186 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, supra vol. 1 at 206 ff. Cf. MAINE, ANCIENT LAw
87 (10th ed.); GuTERBocK, BRACTON AND HIS RELATION TO THE Ro~fAN LAw (Coxe
trans.); 8 BRACTON AND Azo (Maitland ed.).
187 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, supra at 209 and 210.
188 SELDEN'S DISSERTATION ON FLETA Nxii, 15-19 (Ogg ed.); Woodbine, The
Summa of Gilbert de Thornton, 25 L. Q. REv. 44; Plucknett, The Harvard Manu-
script of Thornton's Summa, 51 HA.v. L. REv. 1038.
189 HOLDSWORTH, supra vol. 2 at 321; SELDEN'S DIssERTATION ON FrErA,-supra
at xxiii.
:190 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, supra vol. 1 at 210.
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1328),191 a fishmonger of London, man of wealth and literary pursuits
who rose to become chamberlain of his city. Maitland describes the
author as possessing some of the qualities of a "lawyer, antiquary,
preacher, agitator, pedant, faddest, lunatic, romancer, liar," perhaps
with that of romancer predominating. 192 Like Fleta, and unlike Glan-
vill, Bracton and Britton which were marked successes, the Mirror was
a failure. Written in about 1290 and subsequently described by Lord
Coke' 9 3 as "an ancient and learned treatise," its authenticity as an
accurate reflection of ancient Anglo-Saxon practices seems to have
been first questioned by Reeves.' M But whether authentic as a record
of legal history or interesting as English folk lore, the Mirror illustrates
the considerable Christian influence upon legal institutions at the
time when it was written. "Law," wrote Horn, "is nothing else than
the rules laid down by our holy predecessors in Holy Writ." Trial by
battle is justified by the mortal contest between David and Goliath.19 5
This was neither the first nor the last time for biblical lore to be used
in support of mundane legal institutions. Its innovation lies solely in
its quaintness. "fl
The next great English law text after Bracton was a treatise on
land tenures by Sir Henry de Littleton (c. 1407-1481), a judge of the
Common Pleas (1466-1481). Written probably near the end of his
life, in law French, 9 6 it was addressed to his son, Richard, as an aid
to his study of law. Unlike his predecessor, Glanvill and Bracton,
Littleton borrowed nothing from Roman law. It was the first text on
English property law. Coke later described it not only as an ornament
of the common law, but as "the most perfect and absolute work that
has ever been written in any human science."' 9 7 Natural law theory
gains nothing from this classic of the English law.
It was Littleton's contemporary, Sir John Fortescue (c. 1394-
1476), Chief Justice of the King's Bench (1442-c. 1460), whose broader
interest in public law carried on the natural law tradition of his day.
One of his lesser known works, De Natura Legis Naturae, is described
as being the first treatise on the law of nature written by an English-
man.'9 8 It was composed in Scotland (1461-1464) while its author was
191 7 THE MIRROR OF JUSTIC, SELDEN SOCIETY xvkk. Cf. Leadan, The
Authorship of the Mirror of Justices, 13 L. Q. Rrv. 85-103; Pollock, Book Re-
view, 11 L. Q. Rxv. 393.
192 MIRROR, supra at xlviii.
193 9 COKE'S REPORTS intro.
194 REE Es, His-roRy, supra vol. 2 at 232 and 238; HODSWORTH, supra vol. 2
at 327-333.
195 MIRROR, supra at xxdi, 2, 109.
196 LrrTLETON'S TENuREs lix (Wambaugh ed.); ENCYC. BRir., LTTLETON.
197 COKE ON L1TIn.-rON XXXVi (Hargrave and Butler ed.); WINFIELD, supra
at 309-313; HOLSWORm, supra vol. 2 at 571 ff.
198 FORTESCUE, DE LAIDiBUS LEGUM ANGLIE (Chrimes trans.) xiii.
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in exile with the family of Henry VI, for the benefit of Prince Edward
of Lancaster, and in support of his benefactor's claim to the throne' 99
Subsequently, while with the royal family at St. Mihiel, Fortescue
wrote his best known work, De Laudibus Legium Angliae (1468-
1471). It is in the form of a dialogue between Prince Edward and the
author and was intended for the prince's instruction in legal matters.
Eulogy of English law is interspersed with references to the scriptures,
Grecian philosophers and natural law. "All human laws," he informs
the prince, "are either laws of nature, customs, or statutes, which are
also called constitutions. '2 00 Indeed, not only are the laws of Deu-
teronomy sacred, but also all human ones, since by definition "Law is
a sacred sanction commanding what is honest and forbidding the
contrary." 20 1 But essentially, Fortescue founded English law firmly
upon native ground, and with Littleton introduced an English as
distinguished from a Roman renaissance of legal writing.2 02
Most interesting for its natural law significance is a dialogue
written by Christopher Saint Germain (c. 1460-1540), entitled Doctor
and Student. Its author studied law at the Inner Temple and in due
course was called to the Bar. His library is said to have surpassed in
size those of all his contemporary brethren and his Dialogue was pop-
ular and freely cited. 203 It may have been first published about the
year 1523. "The first ground of the law of England," said the student,
"is the law of reason." Of the law of nature of the learned in the pro-
fession do not speak, but when a rule "is grounded upon the law of
nature, they say that reason will that such a thing be done." This is
probably an accurate explanation of 'the situation and influence of
natural law theory in the law courts of England, as distinguished from
the ecclesiastical where natural law throve as embodied in canon
law.204 Saint Germain's reversion to stoic theory that law in its essence
is only reason, is also prophetic of Lord Coke's famous aphorism.
Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634) was considered to be the greatest
lawyer of his day. In 1606 he was appointed Chief Justice of the Com-
mon Pleas, and in 1613 to the chief justiceship of the King's Bench.
His First and Second Institutes of the Laws of England leave no
question as to his faithful support of common law. And yet in the
First Institute, or Commentary upon Littleton, he wrote that "reason
is the life of the law, nay the common law itselfe is nothing else but
109 WINFIELD, supra at 315; HOLDSWORTH, supra vol. 2 at 569; POLLOCK, Es-
SAYS IN THE LAW 53 and 54.
200 FoRTscoa, supra at 37.
201 Id. at 9.
202 Id. at xix.
203 WINFIELD, supra at 325.
204 HOLDSWORTH, supra vol. 2, App. II; POLLOCK, ESSAYS IN = LAW 53 and
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reason"-and then added "gotten by long study, observation, and ex-
perience, and not of every man's natural reason." 205 In line with this
thought, and contrary to the indirection commonly practiced by the
English bench, described by Saint Germain, Coke in Calvin's Case 206
resorted directly to natural law including the scriptures to prove that
a Scottish subject, born after King James of Scotland ascended the
English throne was not an alien, and hence was capable of holding
English land. The orthodoxy of his reasoning was not to be disputed.
At the time of the creation God infused His law into the hearts of
men. By this law men were governed before Moses, the first law re-
porter, put it into writing. Allegiance to the sovereign is part of that
law. Since by birth Calvin owed allegiance to King James according
to the natural law, "Ergo he is a natural-born subject" of England.
His right to hold English land follows. 207
On November 10, 1608, while Chief Justice of the Common Pleas,
Coke, speaking for the judges of England, informed King James that
although as king he might consult with the judges, he could not ad-
judge a case nor remove a judge from the courts and decide it him-
self; that no king since the Conquest had done so; that the king in
the upper house of Parliament has his court of last appeal; and that
although the king was not below man, he was below God and the law.
The archbishop had informed the King that he had such power, which
belonged to him by the word of God found in the scripture. Arch-
bishops, too, it seems "can cite Scripture for his purpose"; though at
that time he could not quite have quoted to the King from his very
own authorized version of the Bible.
Also during the reign of James I there was John Selden (1584-
1654) whose Table Talk has survived him as a legal classic. He was a
renowned orientalist as well as jurist. In one of his lesser known works
he treated The Law of Nature and of Nations according to the Senti-
ments of the Hebrews.2 0s In it he discussed the seven precepts which
God gave to Moses, and which are said to be the basis of human
justice.2 09
Two other English works should be noted in order to survey the
course of English writings on the legal phase of natural law that
furnished the background for American thinking during the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries. The first of these, Institutes of
205 1 COKE UPON LrrrON §138. "There are divers lawes within the realme
of England ... 3. Lex naturae, the law of nature." Id. at 1lb.
206 7 CoKE's REPoRTs 1 (1609).
207 Id. at 12a, 13a, 24b. And see argument in Sharington v. Strotten, Plow-
den, pt. 1, pg. 298 (case of uses).
208 Herzog, John Seldon and Jewish Law, 13 JOuIRAL OF COmPARATIvE LEG-
ISLATON (3rd Series) 236-245; HoLDswoRTH, supra vol. 5 at 407-412.
209 CUMBF J.AND, supra at 12 and 13.
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Natural Law (1754-1756), was by an ecclesiastic, Thomas Rutherforth
(1712-1771), archdeacon of Essex and regius professor of divinity at
Cambridge. It consisted of a series of lectures on the De Jure Belli et
Pacis of Grotius, which Rutherforth delivered at St. John's College,
Cambridge. There were two American editions, the second appearing
in 1832.
Rutherforth confined his definition of law to "a rule to which men
are obliged to make their moral actions conformable." In this manner
he preserves the moral content of commands. Law is then divided into
two general classes: natural and voluntary. The latter, or positive law,
he subdivides into divine and human. Law, thus defined and classified,
is then discussed generally under the headings of those rights and
obligations of mankind considered as individuals and those considered
as civil societies.
His description of the institution of private property developed
by the descendants of Cain in Genesis, is of interest. In the original
human society all property was held in community, for there is nothing
in nature that requires the recognition of private property. Nor are
men forbidden to surrender their rights in common in favor of
private ownership. Hence as men multiplied, lived separately and
dispersed, the need for private property found no obstacle in nature.
Its recognition rested upon convention; that is, upon a tacit agree-
ment generally admitted, that individual occupancy will be respected.
Thus private property, which Joseph Choate in 1895210 described as
"the very keystone of the arch upon which all civilized government
rests," finds its roots in nature though not in Eden, a point to which
Grotius2 11 and Locke2 12 lend their support.
Perhaps as influential a book as any of the great English law
texts on the training of American lawyers is the Commentaries on the
Law of England, published in 1765-1769 by Sir William Blackstone
(1723-1780), Vinerian professor of law at Oxford, solicitor-general to
Queen Charlotte, and later judge of the court of common pleas.
American editions of the Commentaries appeared in 1771-1772 and
continued for more than one hundred years.213 According to Black-
stone man as a creature of God is subject to the will of his Creator, or
in other words to the law of nature discoverable by reason. This law
or system of laws is universal and no civil law is valid which con-
travenes it. In this description of natural law the wisdom of Cicero,
the organization of the Church fathers, the arguments of protestant
jurists and the writings of English judges are epitomized into the
210 Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 534 (1895).
211 Supra at 27.
212 Supra at 22.
218 WmawEN, THE LFE oF BLACKSTONE 321. The fourth edition of Colley's
Blackstone was printed in 1899.
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introduction which generations of American law students received to
the study of law.
With the Roman Catholic theologians, development of natural
law doctrine had primarily a religious purpose. The Christian religion
is founded upon the law of God. Natural law is its rational counterpart,
to which civil law must conform. As a subsidiary function natural law
was useful to the Church fathers in the political disputes which arose
over the conflicting jurisdictions of Church and state. With Grotius
and a succeeeding line of Protestant jurists, natural law supplied a
basis for converting a Roman ius gentium into a law among nations.
English jurists-who not infrequently were clerics 214-supplemented
court rolls with doctrines of Roman and natural law, to broaden the
base and extend the content of the common law. The chancellor drew
upon them to develop equity. As with the Church fathers, so with
English writers both law and clerical, natural law theory was useful
in explaining political doctrine. To these English writers as to French,
and more remotely to Greek and Roman, our founding fathers looked
for their political creed.
REASON AND NATURE
To the long history of the natural law, reason and nature have
contributed varying roles. Heraclitus began with the participation of
man in the eternal order of nature. With the Stoics reason became
associated with infinite wisdom and with the abiding essence of
creation. A pantheistic religion developed in which the logos, as reason,
was equated to God. During the pagan period of Roman law stoic
metaphysics served to broaden the concept of a philosophical ius
gentium, closely associated with, even if distinguished from natural
law. Roman jurists drew freely upon nature and reason in creating
this system of positive universal law, just as they did in expanding
the ius civile. In Rome reason and nature found their first direct
application as ingredients of positive law in the western world.
Christian legal theory could ask for no greater boon than stoic
precedent of reason and nature in philosophy, and their use as a
philosophical sub-stratum for Roman law. The theology of the dec-
alogue is the law of God. His reason is supreme. The eternal law of
God and the law revealed by Him as recorded in the Bible are the
sources to which rational men may turn in their search for the natural
order of the universe, of which by God's will man is a part. This order
differs after the fall of man from its purity in the Garden of Eden.
Natural law, derived by man's reason from God's law, sets the limits
214 STEPHENS, COMMENTARIUES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (15th ed.).
1952]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
of positive law and prescribes the objectives of government. Moulded
during the middle ages by the Fathers of the Church, this theory
received its enduring expression in Aquinas, and today remains the
orthodox creed of the Roman Catholic Church.
Protestantism and the Enlightenment, humanism and rationalism
during the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, broke
gradually from the orthodoxy of the Church, but not at once with its
theological exegesis of natural law. The emphasis, however, was dif-
ferent, and was directed toward the social nature of man and his
reason. From these sources grew a new ius gentium, an international
law of war and peace. From them also arose new theories of the state,
sometimes patriarchal in origin, sometimes founded upon a fiction of
contract. The advance of science and the greater reliance which men
placed upon reason caused them to look to nature not only for the
ancient roots of government, but for the rights which men could as-
sert as standards for the good life on earth. During the Enlightenment
this use of nature and of reason caused lay writers to forsake the affinity
that natural law has for theology, which characterized the writings of
protestant divines as well as of the Church Fathers, and to study the
history of man, even of the "noble savage" in the American wilderness,
in their quest for utopia. The reason and nature of Montesquieu,
Rousseau or Voltaire, or even of Locke and of Thomas Paine, are not
those of Aquinas or Cumberland, of Grotius, of Cicero or of Zeno. Nor
was the natural law of the Enlightenment that of the Middle Ages, of
the Roman jurists, or of Greece.
In England, too, reason and nature enjoyed various connotations.
In the ecclesiastical courts their theological meaning prevailed in the
form of natural or canon law. And as long as the chancellor was an
ecclesiastic or closely affiliated with the church, he held to similar
views. On this basis doctrines of equity were erected. In the political
realm, however, the conception of reason and nature reflected the age
in which it was used, as well as the clerical or lay predilections concern-
ing government which were advanced. These differences are illustrated
in the works of Hobbes as contrasted with Bishop Cumberland or with
Locke. The theological dominance of one period yielded to the
humanism or rationalism of another, but the victory of neither was
complete. Similarly in law-text writing the variation in meaning is
apparent, corresponding to the lay or clerical background of the
writer. But especially in law the caution of Saint Germain is pertinent,
that while in other countries a rule might be described as one of
natural law, in England its source was attributed to reason.
Just which of these theories of reason and nature or of natural
law was to become dominant in America is not now for discussion.
Although the earliest English law texts had been published before the
Pilgrims landed at Plymouth, their content was largely unknown to
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those colonists. They began with the law of God as revealed to them
in the Bible. During the next one hundred and fifty odd years, how-
ever, which intervened between Plymouth and the signing of the
Declaration of Independence, the cross currents of lay and clerical
writings on natural law, on natural rights and on theories of the state
with which the Reformation and the Enlightment refuted the Middle
Ages, formed the complex background of legal and political theory
for American lawyers and statesmen, just as they did for those in
England and Europe. The confidence with which the humanists of
these two centuries rationalized natural man and his law with fre-
quent references to the noble savages of this new-found land, seems
scarcely warranted either in light of the confusion which they in-
jected into concepts of reason and nature, or natural law and natur-
al rights, or in light of the serenity of doctrine with which the Pil-
grim fathers first encountered these native Americans in their New
England primeval haunts.
Basically all of these theories of reason and nature or of natural
law and natural rights have one common ingredient: whether asso-
ciated with orthodox Christian revelation or humanistic rationalism,
they each attest to the faith of democratic man that the actual does
not of necessity exclude the ideal. Law as force alone is never a satis-
factory explanation of governmental power. Might and right must
be united before their reign as law becomes satisfactory in a demo-
cratic sense. This is essentially the thesis of any theory of higher or
natural law. In its divergent manifestations, natural law and its ac-
companying doctrine of rights are simply the belief of rational man
in his ability to predicate the essentials of his cultural existence un-
der good government, upon a critical analysis of his own cultural his-
tory. Modern political thought may question the sources from which
these standards arise, and even the objectives which they champion,
but it does not deny the fusion of the real and the ideal. It may have
become skeptical regarding the easy attainment of goals, but it be-
lieves just as implicitly as formerly in man's natural rights to strive to
attain them. The doctrine of man's natural dignity, of the function of
government to support his ideals, and of his reasoning ability to dis-
cover ways and means to realize his potentials in civil society, wheth-
er attributed to the wisdom of Grecian philosophy, to the revelations
of Hebrew-Christian theology or to scientific sociological observation,
is the basic thesis of democratic government and also of natural law.
In America as well as at Rome law may be /us as well as lex. - All
this and much more is our natural law heritage in America.
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